CVE-2026-98432
A use-after-free in IPv4 TCP, exploited to root, with patching that moved slower than the vulnerability itself.
TL;DR: CVE-2026-98432 is a use-after-free race in the Linux kernel’s IPv4 TCP handshake code, present since kernel 4.4 (Jan 2016). CVSS 9.8 (Network, Low complexity, No privileges, No interaction). Anthropic demonstrated a remote root exploit via an MPTCP listener on Oct 27, 2026. Upstream fix (commit e3f33b0a1d89) landed Oct 5. Red Hat shipped fixed kernels Nov 1, Ubuntu generic LTS fixed Nov 5–6. Still not in CISA KEV as of Nov 9, 2026. No public exploit code released.
The Bug
The kernel handles a TCP connection like this:
- Client sends a SYN (possibly with IP options like Record Route or Timestamp).
- Kernel stores the options with the request socket (
ireq->ireq_opt). - Handshake completes.
tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock()transfers ownership ofireq_optto the child socket without copying. - Client retransmits the SYN. Another CPU processes this retransmit and builds a SYN-ACK using
ip_options_build()onireq_opt. - If the child socket is torn down between steps 3 and 4,
inet_sock_destruct()callskfree()onireq_opt. - The SYN-ACK path reads freed memory.
Use after free. Classic.
A second variant affects request-socket migration (net.ipv4.tcp_migrate_req=1 or a BPF_SK_REUSEPORT_SELECT_OR_MIGRATE program), which is off by default on most distros.
IPv6 is not affected — tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock() copies the options instead of transferring.
The Fix
Eric Dumazet wrote the fix. Two kfree() calls became kfree_rcu():
// Before (simplified)
kfree(inet->inet_opt);
kfree(ireq->ireq_opt);
// After
kfree_rcu(inet->inet_opt, inet_opt);
kfree_rcu(ireq->ireq_opt, ireq_opt);
The RCU grace period ensures other CPUs finish reading before the buffer is reclaimed. Commit e3f33b0a1d89 was merged into stable branches on Oct 5, 2026.
Fixed kernel versions: 5.10.272, 5.15.223, 6.1.190, 6.6.159, 6.12.113, 6.18.56, 7.2.10, and 7.3+.
The Exploit
Anthropic’s researcher Xinyang Ge reported the bug. On Oct 27, Anthropic published a blog post describing an exploit chain built by an unreleased internal Claude model:
Stage 1 — KASLR leak: The race is won repeatedly until the kernel sends extra bytes back to the attacker. One of those replies contains a kernel pointer. KASLR defeated.
Stage 2 — Code execution: The same race overflows a buffer, overwrites a callback pointer, and chains existing kernel functions to execute an arbitrary command as root.
The chain took ~48 minutes for the leak, ~5 minutes for execution. Anthropic demonstrated it against a server with an MPTCP listener. The exploit code has not been published.
CVSS and Scores: Why Everyone Disagrees
| Source | Score | Reasoning |
|---|---|---|
| Kernel CNA (kernel.org) | 9.8 Critical | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| Red Hat | 8.1 Important → 9.8 Critical | Race is “complex” to win; most likely DoS, RCE proven but not confirmed in the wild |
| Amazon Linux | 9.3 | CVSS v4.0 |
| SUSE | 8.1 | CVSS v3.1 |
The kernel CNA’s 9.8 assumes an attacker who can send TCP SYNs with IP options, retransmit, and repeat — low complexity. Red Hat initially gave 5.9 (Moderate) because the race is hard to win and only a crash had been observed, then raised to 8.1 after Anthropic’s post, then to 9.8 Critical when they shipped fixed kernels Nov 1.
Distribution Patch Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Oct 5 | Upstream fix committed |
| Oct 15 | CVE published |
| Oct 16–22 | Debian 12/13, Oracle UEK ship fixed kernels |
| Oct 24 | Kernel CNA assigns CVSS 9.8 |
| Oct 27 | Anthropic publishes exploit post |
| Oct 29 | Amazon Linux 2023 fixes; Go 1.24 enables MPTCP by default |
| Nov 1 | RHEL 8, 9, 10 fixed (RHSA-2026:93412–93415) |
| Nov 2 | OpenShift 4 still affected |
| Nov 3 | SUSE SLES 15 SP7 fixed; Red Hat adds EUS fixes |
| Nov 5–6 | Ubuntu generic LTS/interim kernels fixed (-updates) |
| Nov 6 | Sophos Firewall hotfix (HF110626.1) |
The story here: RHEL and Ubuntu LTS — two of the most widely deployed enterprise Linux platforms — shipped fixed kernels two to three weeks after the upstream fix. Debian and Oracle moved faster. For teams running RHEL 8–10 or Ubuntu 22.04/24.04 LTS on Oct 27, the exploit existed in public for 11 days with no patch available.
Go 1.24 and MPTCP Defaults
The Go Security Team warned that Go 1.24+ enables MPTCP on Linux listening sockets by default. This matters because Anthropic’s RCE exploit required an MPTCP listener.
Mitigation for Go programs:
// Build-time
// godebug multipathtcp=0
// Or at runtime
// GODEBUG=multipathtcp=0
But the underlying bug isn’t specific to MPTCP — it’s in core IPv4 TCP. The Go team says disabling MPTCP is a “fragile” mitigation because a single MPTCP listener leaves the system exposed.
Hunting and Mitigation
No exploitation in the wild has been reported as of Nov 9, 2026. Not in CISA KEV. EPSS ~0.8%, 56th percentile.
Quick checks
- Kernel version:
uname -ragainst the fixed-version table above. - MPTCP listener:
ss -mptcp -l— any listening ports with MPTCP enabled? - IP options in traffic:
nft list ruleset | grep ip options— any firewall rules already filtering them?
Mitigation (temporary, before patch)
Red Hat’s nftables mitigation table (from RHSB-2026-016) drops SYNs with IP options:
table inet cve_2026_98432 {
chain input {
meta l4proto tcp tcp optlen > 0 drop
}
}
This blocks the primary attack path (SYN with IP options) but doesn’t address the request-socket migration variant. It’s a reasonable bridge until you can patch and reboot.
Why This Matters for Practitioners
Patch latency still bites. The upstream fix existed Oct 5. RHEL users didn’t get a fixed kernel until Nov 1. That’s 27 days. If you run RHEL or Ubuntu LTS and haven’t patched, your attack surface is wider than you think.
CVSS 9.8 doesn’t mean “exploited right now.” It means “the math says it should be exploitable.” Anthropic proved it. Red Hat took weeks to agree. The score is a ceiling, not a prediction.
Containers inherit the host kernel. Patching containers doesn’t help — the host kernel is what matters.
MPTCP is a force multiplier. If you run services on MPTCP (Go 1.24+ defaults to it), the RCE path is confirmed. If not, the race still exists but RCE hasn’t been demonstrated without MPTCP.
AI-built exploits are real. Anthropic’s exploit was written by an unreleased Claude model after “initial prompting.” No public exploit code exists yet, but the methodology works: describe the function, run the race 10,000 times, collect the kernel pointer, chain the callback. This is reproducible.